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Joint Ventures of Nonprofits and For-Profits
by
Terri Lynn Helge
I.
Introduction.1
This
article
summarizes special tax considerations that
should be taken into account when for-profit
parties seek to engage in joint ventures with
charitable organizations. In particular, there
are two areas of concern unique to charitable
organizations with respect to joint ventures
with for-profit parties. First, certain rules
restrict
or
prohibit
a
charitable
organization’s ability to enter into
transactions with its insiders. Second, a
charitable organization’s participation in a
joint venture with a taxable party may cause
the charitable organization to incur unrelated
business taxable income or lose its taxexempt status. Underlying both of these
areas of concern is the overriding concern
that a charitable organization be organized
primarily for the conduct of its charitable
purposes and not engage in any activity that
results in private inurement or private
benefit.
A. Private Inurement. Section 501(c)(3)
of the Code2 provides that no part of the net
earnings of an organization described
therein may inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual.
The
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) takes the
position that any element of private
inurement can cause an organization to lose
or be deprived of tax exemption, and that
there is no de minimis exception.3
The
1

As required by United States Treasury
Regulations, this article is not intended or written
to be used, and cannot be used, by any person for
the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be
imposed under the United States federal tax
laws.
2
All references to the “Code” are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3
Gen. Couns. Mem. 35855 (June 17, 1974).
The U.S. Tax Court has also adopted this
approach. McGahen v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 468,
482 (1981), aff'd, 720 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1983);
Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v.
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 507 (1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 163
(2d Cir. 1981).

private inurement prohibition contemplates a
transaction
between
a
charitable
organization and an individual in the nature
of an “insider,” who is able to cause
application of the organization’s assets for
private purposes because of his or her
position.4
In general, an organization’s
directors, officers, members, founders and
substantial contributors are insiders. The
meaning of the term “net earnings” in the
private inurement context has been largely
framed by the courts. Most decisions reflect
a pragmatic approach, rather than a literal
construction of the phrase “net earnings.”5
Common transactions that may involve
private inurement include (i) excessive
compensation for services; (ii) inflated or
unreasonable rental prices; (iii) certain loan
arrangements involving the assets of a
charitable organization; (iv) purchases of
assets for more than fair market value; and
(v) certain joint ventures with commercial
entities.

4

See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c); see, e.g, South
Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158, 188
(1978) (stating that the private inurement
prohibition has generally been applied to an
organization’s founders or those in control of the
organization).
5
See, e.g., Texas Trade Sch. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C.
642 (1958) (holding that net earnings inured to
insiders’ benefit when the insiders leased
property to an organization and caused it to make
expensive improvements that would remain after
the lease expired); Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B.
123 (holding that an organization did not qualify
for tax exemption because private inurement
occurred when (i) the organization’s principal
asset was stock in the insiders’ family-owned
corporation, and (ii) the organization’s trustees
failed to vote against the corporation’s issuance
of a new class of preferred stock, diluting the
organization’s holdings); Tech. Adv. Mem.
9130002 (Mar. 19, 1991) (concluding that
private inurement occurred when a hospital sold
a facility to a private entity controlled by insiders
for less than the fair market value).
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B. Private Benefit.
A charitable
organization may not confer a “private
benefit” on persons who are not within the
charitable class of persons who are intended
to benefit from the organization’s
operations, unless the private benefit is
purely incidental. The purpose of the
private benefit limitation is to ensure that
charitable organizations are operated for
public purposes because of their special tax
status.6 The determination of whether the
private benefit is more than incidental is
based on a “balancing test” set forth in a
1987 General Counsel Memorandum:
A private benefit is considered
incidental only if it is incidental in
both a qualitative and a quantitative
sense. In order to be incidental in a
qualitative sense, the benefit must
be a necessary concomitant of the
activity which benefits the public at
large, i.e., the activity can be
accomplished only by benefiting
certain private individuals. To be
incidental in a quantitative sense,
the private benefit must not be
substantial after considering the
overall public benefit conferred by
the activity.7
If an organization provides more than
incidental private benefit, the organization’s
tax-exempt status may be revoked.8

The
“private
benefit
doctrine”
subsumes, and is technically distinct from,
the private inurement doctrine, and is not
limited to situations where benefits accrue to
an organization’s insiders.9 The IRS has
been more willing to accept the contention
that incidental private benefit, as opposed to
incidental private inurement, will not
preclude or defeat tax exemption.10
II.

Joint Ventures with Insiders.

A. Private Foundations. In general, a
“private foundation” is a charitable
organization that is funded by contributions
from only a few sources (usually a single
family or company) and that typically
accomplishes its charitable purposes by
making grants to other charitable
organizations. Section 4941 of the Code
imposes a tax on “disqualified persons” who
participate in acts of self-dealing with a
private foundation. In particular, Section
4941 of the Code prohibits direct or indirect
acts of “self dealing” between a private
foundation and those individuals or entities
who are “disqualified persons” with respect
to the foundation. For this purpose, the term
“disqualified person” includes:
(1) a substantial contributor (one
who contributes more than
$5,000 to the foundation, if such
contribution is more than 2% of
the total contributions received
before
the
end
of
the
foundation’s taxable year);
(2) a foundation manager;
(3) the owner of more than 20% of a
business or trust which is a
substantial contributor;

6
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
According to the Treasury Regulations, an
organization does not qualify for exemption
unless it serves a public rather than a
private interest. Thus . . . it is necessary
for an organization to establish that it is
not organized or operated for the benefit
of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family,
shareholders of the organization, or
persons
controlled,
directly
or
indirectly, by such private interests.
Id.
7
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23,
1987) (citations omitted). The Internal Revenue
Service’s balancing test was adopted by the Tax
Court in American Campaign Academy v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
8
For example, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that an organization formed to promote

interest in classical music was not exempt
because its only method of achieving its goal
was to support a commercial radio station that
was in financial difficulty. Rev. Rul. 76-206,
1976-1 C.B. 154.
9
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39876 (Aug. 10, 1992).
10
See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200044039 (Nov. 6,
2000) (ruling that a contract would not defeat an
organization’s tax-exempt status because it
resulted in no private inurement and no more
than incidental private benefit).
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(4) a member of the family of any of
the preceding;
(5) a corporation, trust, estate, or
partnership more than 35% of
which is owned or held by any of
the preceding; or
(6) a government official.11
A “foundation manager” includes officers
and directors of a private foundation and any
employee who has the authority or
responsibility with respect to an act that
constitutes self-dealing.12
A person is
considered a “member of the family” if such
person is the spouse, ancestor, child,
grandchild or great grandchild of the
individual who is a disqualified person.13
The prohibited acts of self-dealing,
direct or indirect, between a disqualified
person and a private foundation include the
following:
(1) The sale, exchange or lease
(other than a rent-free lease to a
private foundation) of property
between a private foundation and
a disqualified person.
(2) The lending of money or other
extension of credit between a
private
foundation
and
a
disqualified person. An interestfree loan by a disqualified person
to a private foundation is
excepted from this prohibition,
provided that the loan proceeds
are used exclusively for exempt
purposes.
(3) The furnishing of goods, services
or facilities between a private
foundation and a disqualified
person
(other
than
those
furnished by a disqualified
person to a private foundation
without charge and for use
exclusively
for
exempt
purposes).
(4) The payment of compensation to
a disqualified person for services

unrelated to carrying out the
foundation’ s exempt purposes
and the payment of excessive
compensation (or payment or
reimbursement of excessive
expenses) by a private foundation
to a disqualified person, except a
government official, to whom the
payment of compensation is even
more severely proscribed.
(5) The transfer to or use by a
disqualified person of the income
or assets of a private foundation.
(6) The agreement by a private
foundation to make any payment
of money or other property to a
government official, other than
an agreement to employ such
official for a period after
termination from government
employment and certain other
limited types of payments.14
In considering whether a transaction
between a private foundation and a
disqualified person is an act of self-dealing,
it is immaterial whether the transaction
results in a benefit or detriment to the
foundation.15
The initial tax on a disqualified person
who participates in self-dealing is 10% of
the amount involved.16 In addition, the
initial excise tax on a foundation manager
who knowingly participates in an act of selfdealing between a disqualified person and a
private foundation is 5% of the amount
involved, unless such participation is not
willful and is due to reasonable cause.17 The
initial excise tax on foundation managers is
capped at $20,000.18 If a disqualified person
engages in an act of self-dealing with a
private foundation, corrective action must be
14

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1), (2).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(a).
16
I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1). The “amount involved”
means the greater of the amount of money or fair
market value of other property given by the
private foundation or the amount of money or
fair market value of other property received by
the private foundation. I.R.C. § 4941(e)(2).
17
I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2).
18
Id.
15

11

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1). The term “government
official” is defined in Code Section 4946(c).
12
I.R.C. § 4946(b).
13
I.R.C. § 4946(d).
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taken to essentially undo the act of selfdealing to the extent possible and put the
private foundation in a financial position not
worse than that in which it would be if the
disqualified person were dealing under the
highest fiduciary standards.19 The selfdealing excise tax is imposed each calendar
year until the act of self-dealing is
corrected.20

engage in excess benefit transactions with
public charities.
An “excess benefit
transaction” is any transaction in which an
economic benefit is provided by the public
charity directly or indirectly to or for the use
of any disqualified person, if the value of the
economic benefit provided exceeds the
value of the consideration (including the
performance of services) received in
exchange for such benefit.23 The term
“transaction” is used very generally and
includes a disqualified person’s use of a
charitable organization’s property and
services provided to a disqualified person
without adequate payment. Prototypical
examples of excess benefit transactions
include paying excessive compensation to a
director or officer or overpaying a director
or officer for property the director or officer
sells to the charitable organization.
However, any direct or indirect benefit to a
disqualified person may result in a violation
of Section 4958 if the disqualified person
does not provide adequate consideration for
the benefit.
The term “disqualified person”
includes any person who was, at any time
during the 5-year period ending on the date
of the transaction, in a position to exercise
substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.24 Some persons, including
(but not limited to) board members, the
president or chief executive officer, the
treasurer or chief financial officer, family
members of such individuals, and entities in
which such individuals own 35% of the
interests, are automatically considered
“disqualified.”25 Where a person is not
automatically disqualified, all of the facts
and circumstances will generally be
considered to determine if the person has
substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.26
Being a substantial
contributor to the organization is a fact
tending to show that the person has

B. Public Charities.
In general, a
charitable organization is presumed to be a
private foundation unless it can establish
that it qualifies as a public charity under
Sections 509(a)(1)–(3) of the Code. Types
of public charities described under Section
509(a)(1) of the Code include churches,
schools, hospitals, government entities and
university endowment funds.21 In addition,
an organization which normally receives
more than one-third of its total support from
contributions from the general public is
considered a public charity under Section
509(a)(1) of the Code.22 An organization
which receives more than one-third of its
total support from exempt function
revenues, such as admission fees to a
museum or patient revenues for a hospital, is
considered a public charity under Section
509(a)(2) of the Code, provided the
organization does not normally receive more
than one-third of its support from gross
investment income. An organization which
does not meet either of these tests may still
qualify as a public charity under Section
509(a)(3) of the Code as a “supporting
organization” of another public charity by
virtue of the relationship between the first
organization and the second public charity.
Section 4958 of the Code imposes an
excise tax on disqualified persons who
19

I.R.C. § 4941(e)(3).
The Treasury
Regulations contain specific procedures to
correct certain acts of self-dealing between a
private foundation and a disqualified person. See
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1(c).
20
I.R.C. § 4941(a), (e)(1).
21
I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v).
22
I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(2).

23

I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1).
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).
25
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).
26
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e).
24
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substantial influence and is therefore
disqualified.27
When it applies, Section 4958 imposes
an initial tax equal to 25% of the excess
benefit on any disqualified person. 28 A tax
of 10% of the excess benefit is imposed on
any organization manager, i.e., any officer,
director, or trustee of the organization, who
knowingly participates in the transaction.29
The initial excise tax on organization
managers is capped at $20,000.30 If a
disqualified person engages in an excess
benefit transaction with a public charity,
corrective action must be taken to essentially
undo the excess benefit to the extent
possible and to take any additional measures
to put the public charity in a financial
position not worse than that in which it
would be if the disqualified person were
dealing under the highest fiduciary
standards.31
The Treasury regulations provide for a
procedure, which if followed, creates a
rebuttable presumption that a transaction
between a public charity and a disqualified
person will not constitute an excess benefit
transaction within the meaning of Section
4958 of the Code. These procedures apply
to fixed payments and, with minor
additional requirements, to non-fixed
payments subject to a cap.32 Legislative
history
indicates
that
compensation
arrangement or other financial transactions
will be presumed to be reasonable if the
transaction arrangement was approved in
advance by an independent board (or an
independent committee of the board) that (1)
was composed entirely of individuals
unrelated to and not subject to the control of
the disqualified person, (2) obtained and

relied upon appropriate data as to
comparability,
and
(3)
adequately
documented the basis for its determination.33
The Treasury Regulations read into the
legislative
history
three
distinct
requirements: (1) approval by an authorized
body, (2) the appropriate data as to
comparability, and (3) the documentation.34
1. Approval by an Authorized Body. The
authorized body may be the Board of
Directors or a committee duly authorized
under state law to act on behalf of the Board
of Directors.35 A person is not considered
part of the authorized body if he merely
meets to provide information to the board
and then recuses himself.36 No person
voting on the matter may have a conflict of
interest with respect to the transaction.37 A
member of the authorized body does not
have a conflict of interest if the member:
i. is not the disqualified person or
related to any disqualified person
who benefits from the transaction;
ii. is not employed by or controlled
by any disqualified person
benefiting from the transaction;
iii. is not receiving compensation or
other
payments
from
a
disqualified person benefiting
from the transaction;
iv. has no material financial interest
affected by the compensation
arrangement or transaction; and
v. does not approve a transaction
providing economic benefits to
any
disqualified
person
participating in the compensation
arrangement or transaction, who
in turn has approved or will
approve a transaction providing
economic
benefits
to
the
member.38

27

Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2).
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).
29
I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).
30
I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2).
31
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6).
The Treasury
Regulations contain specific procedures to
correct certain excess benefit transactions
between a public charity and a disqualified
person. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7.
32
Non-fixed payments to a disqualified person
not subject to a cap are generally not advisable.
28

33
34
35
36
37
38

H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A)-(C).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(E).
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2. Appropriate Data as to Comparability.
The authorized body must have sufficient
information to determine whether a
compensation
arrangement
or
other
transaction will result in the payment of
reasonable compensation or a transaction for
fair value. Relevant information includes,
but is not limited to:
i. compensation levels paid by other
similarly-situated
organizations
(taxable or tax-exempt);
ii. availability of similar services in
the applicable geographic area;
iii. independent
compensation
surveys;
iv. written offers from similar
institutions competing for the
services of the person;
v. independent appraisals of all
property to be transferred; or
vi. offers for property received as
part of an open and competitive
bidding process.39

III. Joint Ventures with Third Parties.
Participation in joint ventures affords
charitable organizations with numerous
opportunities, such as to (1) further their
exempt purposes, (2) diversify their revenue
source, and (3) obtain needed capital or
expertise in an increasingly competitive
economic environment.41 While these types
of business arrangements can be highly
profitable and truly beneficial to both the
charitable and for-profit organizations
involved, there is a serious risk for the
participating charitable organization. The
failure of the charitable organization to
protect its charitable assets can lead the loss
its federal tax exemption.
Prior to 1982, a charitable organization
automatically ceased to qualify as tax
exempt under Code Section 501(c)(3) when
it served as a general partner in a partnership
that included private investors as limited
partners. The IRS’s reasoning was that the
obligations of the charitable general partner
to its for-profit limited partners were
incompatible with its requirement to operate
exclusively for charitable purposes. The
IRS’s per se opposition to charitable
organizations’ involvement in joint ventures
with for-profit investors was abandoned,
however, in 1982, with the issuance of the
Plumstead Theatre Society decision.

3. Documentation. For the decision to be
adequately documented, the records of the
authorized body must note:
i. the terms of the transaction and
the date it was approved;
ii. the members of the authorized
body who were present during the
debate on the transaction or
arrangement and those who voted
on it;
iii. the comparability data obtained
and relied upon and how the data
was obtained;
iv. the actions taken with respect to
consideration of the transaction by
anyone who is otherwise a
member of the authorized body
but who had a conflict of interest
with respect to the transaction;
and
v. the basis for any deviation from
the range of comparable data
obtained.40

A. Plumstead
Theatre
Society
v.
Commissioner. In Plumstead, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
charitable organization’s participation as a
general partner in a limited partnership
involving private investors did not

next meeting of the authorized body (or within
60 days after the final action of the authorized
body, if later than the next meeting) and must be
reviewed and approved as reasonable, accurate
and complete within a reasonable time period
thereafter. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii).
41
See generally Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish
Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance
on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint
Ventures, 6 NEV. L. J. 21 (2005).

39

Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i)(A)-(D), (ii).
Moreover, such records must be prepared by the
40
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jeopardize its tax exempt status.42 The
theatre company at question co-produced a
play as one of its charitable activities. Prior
to the opening of the play, the theatre
company encountered financial difficulties
in raising its share of costs.43 In order to
meet its funding obligations, the theatre
company formed a limited partnership in
which it served as general partner, and two
individuals and a for-profit corporation were
the limited partners. The IRS denied taxexempt status to the theatre company on the
grounds that it was not operated exclusively
for charitable purposes. Based on the
safeguards contained in the limited
partnership agreement, which served to
insulate the theatre company from potential
conflicts with its exempt purposes, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the
IRS, holding that the theatre company was
operated exclusively for charitable (and
educational) purposes, and therefore was
entitled to tax exemption. One of the
significant factors supporting the court’s
holding was its finding that the limited
partners had no control over the theatre
company’s operations or over the
management of the partnership.44 Another
significant factor was that the theatre
company was not obligated for the return of
any capital contribution made by the limited
partners from the theatre company’s own
funds.45
Following its defeat in this landmark
court decision, the IRS abandoned its prior
per se opposition and formulated the basis
on which charitable organizations could
become general partners in joint ventures
without violating the terms of their
exemption.

in which it set forth the required analysis in
testing
a
charitable
organization’s
participation as a general partner in a limited
partnership involving private investors. The
IRS used a two-prong “close scrutiny” test
to determine the permissibility of joint
venture arrangements between charitable
and for-profit organizations.
The IRS
reiterated that participation by a charitable
organization as a general partner in a limited
partnership with private investors would not
per se endanger its tax exempt status.46
However, close scrutiny would be necessary
to ensure that the obligations of the
charitable organization as general partner do
not conflict with its ability to pursue
exclusively charitable goals.47
Thus, in all partnership cases, the
initial focus should be on whether
the joint venture organization
furthers a charitable purpose.
Once charitability is established,
the partnership agreement itself
should be examined to see
whether the arrangement permits
the exempt party to act
exclusively in furtherance of the
purposes for which exemption is
granted, and not for the benefit of
the limited partners.48
The foregoing required a finding that the
benefits received by the limited partners are
incidental to the public purposes served by
the partnership.49
In other words, the two-pronged “close
scrutiny” test requires that: (1) the activities
of the joint venture further the charitable
purposes of the charitable organization; and
(2) the structure of the venture insulate the
charitable organization from potential
conflicts between its charitable purposes and
its joint venture obligations, and minimizes
the likelihood that the arrangement will
generate private benefit. If the charitable
organization fails to satisfy either test and
the activities of the joint venture are

B. The IRS’s Two-Part Test for Joint
Ventures. Soon after Plumstead, the IRS
issued General Counsel Memoranda 39005
42

Plumstead Theatre Society v. Comm’r, 675
F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982) aff’g 74 T.C. 1324
(1980).
43
Id.
44
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200502046 (Oct. 18, 2004).
45
Id.

46
47
48
49

Gen. Couns. Mem. 39005 (June 28, 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sufficient control over the venture.53
Although Revenue Ruling 98-15 lists a
number of relevant factors, four factors
appear to be most significant: (1)
governance control of the joint venture; (2)
control of day-to-day operations of the joint
venture; (3) management of conflicts of
interest between the tax-exempt and forprofit participants; and (4) priority of
charitable purposes over profit motives in
the joint venture operations.
Based on substantial scrutiny of
Revenue Ruling 98-15 after its release,
several conclusions can be drawn. First,
charitable organizations may participate in a
joint venture with private investors and not
automatically jeopardize their tax-exempt
status. Second, in such situations, the joint
venture agreement should clearly provide
that the charitable partner’s charitable
purposes supersede any financial or private
concerns in the event of a conflict between
those goals. In addition, all contracts and
agreements between the joint venture and
another for-profit entity, such as a
management agreement, must be entered
into at arm’s length and reflect
commercially reasonable terms. Finally,
Revenue Ruling 98-15 clearly favors the
control of the joint venture’s governing body
by the charitable organization and elevates
this
component
to
unprecedented
importance.54

substantial, the IRS may seek to revoke the
charitable organization’s tax exemption.
C. Control by the Charitable Organization
is a Key Factor. In evaluating joint ventures
between charitable organizations and forprofit organizations, the focus of the IRS in
applying the two-pronged close scrutiny test
eventually evolved into a “facts-andcircumstances” determination.
This
determination focused on whether the
charitable organization retained sufficient
control over the joint venture activities,
thereby ensuring that the organization’s own
charitable purposes were furthered or
accomplished through its participation in the
joint venture and no more than incidental
benefit, financial or otherwise, was
conferred on the for-profit participants.
1. Revenue Ruling 98-15.
Revenue
Ruling 98-15 was the first guidance with
precedential value promulgated by the IRS
with respect to joint ventures between
charitable organizations and for-profit
entities.50 The ruling incorporates the twopart close scrutiny test set forth in General
Counsel Memorandum 39005 with a focus
on whether charitable organizations
“control” the ventures in which they
participate.51 The IRS saw the charitable
organization’s control of the venture as
crucial because it provided the charitable
organization with an ability to ensure that
the venture’s activities were exclusively in
furtherance of the charitable organization’s
exempt purposes and served as a safeguard
against too much benefit, financial or
otherwise, being conferred on the for-profit
participants.
Revenue Ruling 98-15 describes two
scenarios: one “good” and one “bad” joint
venture involving nonprofit and for-profit
healthcare organizations.52
The IRS
scrutinizes a variety of factors that
determine whether the nonprofit has

2. Redlands
Surgical
Services
v.
Commissioner. In Redlands, the Tax Court
upheld the IRS’s denial of tax exempt status
to a charitable organization which formed a
joint venture with for-profit organizations.55
In arriving at its decision that private, rather
than charitable, interests were being served,
the court examined various factors similar to
the factors the IRS enunciated in Revenue
Ruling 98-15.56 The court noted, most
53

Id.
See generally Mirkay, supra note 41.
55
Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113
T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.
2001).
56
Id.
54

50
51
52

Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17.
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exempt hospital.62 The court held that the
determination of whether a charitable
organization that enters into a partnership
with for-profit partners operates exclusively
for exempt purposes is not limited to
“whether the partnership provides some (or
even an extensive amount of) charitable
services.”63 The charitable partner also must
have the “capacity to ensure that the
partnership’s operations further charitable
purposes.”64 Thus, “the [charity] should
lose its tax-exempt status if it cedes control
to the for-profit entity.”65 The Fifth Circuit
ultimately wanted to see majority control by
the charitable organization.
The IRS
continues to view its position on control of
the joint venture by the charitable
organization, as supported by the St. David’s
decision, as the “proper framework” for
analyzing joint ventures between charitable
organizations and for-profit entities.66

significantly, that there was a lack of any
express or implied obligation of the forprofit parties to place charitable objectives
ahead of for-profit objectives.57 Moreover,
the relevant organizational documents did
not include an overriding charitable
purpose.58 The Tax Court held that the
requirement that a charitable organization
operate exclusively for charitable purposes
is not satisfied merely by establishing
“whatever
charitable
benefits
[the
partnership] may produce,” finding that the
charitable partner lacked “formal or
informal control sufficient to ensure
furtherance of charitable purposes.”59
Affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that ceding “effective
control”
of
partnership
activities
impermissibly serves private interests.60
Redlands provides that a charitable
organization may form partnerships, or enter
into contracts, with private parties to further
its charitable purposes on mutually
beneficial terms, “so long as the charitable
organization does not thereby impermissibly
serve private interests.”61

4. Revenue Ruling 2004-51. Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 is the first instance in which
the IRS acknowledges and supports equal
ownership by charitable and for-profit
participants in a joint venture, provided
some protections are in place to ensure the
furtherance of the charitable organization’s
exempt purposes.67 The ruling pointedly
looks at which partner controls the exempt
activities. If the charitable partner controls
the exempt activities, the joint venture
presumably will not endanger the tax
exemption of the charitable organization.
Specifically, Revenue Ruling 2004-51
involved an exempt university that formed a
limited liability company with a for-profit
entity to provide distance learning via
interactive video. Ownership of the joint
venture was split equally between the
university and the for-profit partner, but the
university controlled the academic portion

3. St. David’s Health Care System v.
United States. The issue of whether a
charitable organization’s participation in a
joint venture with for-profit participants
would cause loss of the charitable
organization’s tax exempt status was
revisited in St. David’s, a case tried right
here in Austin. Relying on Revenue Ruling
98-15 and Redlands, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals focused on the issue of the
charitable organization’s control over the
joint venture, ultimately concluding that
genuine issues of material fact existed with
respect
to
whether
the
charitable
organization “ceded control” of its tax-

57

62

Id.
Id.
59
Id.
60
242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
61
Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974 (quoting
Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C.
47 (1999))

St. David’s Health Care System v. United
States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
63
Id. at 243.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 239.
66
Id.
67
Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974.

58
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of the joint venture’s activities, while the
for-profit partner provided and controlled
production expertise. The ruling concluded
that the university’s exempt status was not
affected by the joint venture because the
activities constituted an insubstantial part of
the university’s activities.68 The ruling also
implies that fifty-fifty control of the joint
venture is acceptable as long as the
charitable partner controls the charitable
aspects of the joint venture.69
Even though Revenue Ruling 2004-51
marks an indisputable movement forward in
the IRS’s stance regarding the proper federal
income tax treatment of joint ventures
between charitable organizations and forprofit organizations, the ruling stops short of
answering all of the questions and issues
raised by venturers. In particular, Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 does not modify Revenue
Ruling 98-15.
Therefore, the control
requirement set forth in Revenue Ruling 9815 is still viewed as essential by the IRS,
continuing to raise questions as to how and
when it may be applied.
IV. Unrelated Business Income
(“UBIT”): General Rules.70

income tax has been imposed on a charity’s
net income from a regularly carried on trade
or business that is unrelated to the charity’s
tax-exempt purposes.
Often times, the
justification for imposing this tax on a
charity’s net income from unrelated business
activities is that such activities involve
unfair competition with the charity’s forprofit counterparts.71
Organizations
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code
are generally subject to income tax on the
net income produced from engaging in an
unrelated trade or business activity.72 The
term “unrelated trade or business” means an
activity conducted by a tax-exempt
organization which is regularly carried on73
for the production of income from the sale
of goods or performance of services74 and
which is not substantially related to the
performance
of
the
organization’s
charitable, educational or other exempt
functions.75
1. Activity is a “Trade or Business.” For
purposes of the unrelated business income
tax regime, “the term ‘trade or business’ has
the same meaning it has in Section 162, and
generally includes any activity carried on for
the production of income from the sale of
goods or performance of services.”76
Section 162 of the Code governs the
deductibility of trade or business expenses.
In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court has
declared that “to be engaged in a trade or
business, the taxpayer must be involved in

Tax

A. Definition of Unrelated Business.
Since the 1950s, the unrelated business
68

Id.
Id. Revenue Ruling 2004-51 further stated
that the limited liability company’s activities
would not generate unrelated business income
for the university because (1) the university had
exclusive control over the educational content,
(2) all contracts entered into by the limited
liability company were at arms length and for
fair market value, (3) allocations and
distributions were proportional to each member’s
ownership interest, (4) the video courses covered
the same content as the university’s traditional
classes, and (5) the video courses increased
access to the university’s educational programs.
Id.
70
Portions of this discussion on unrelated
business income are extracted from the author’s
previously published article, The Taxation of
Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV.
883 (2010).
69

71

See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (“The primary
objective of adoption of the unrelated business
income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair
competition by placing the unrelated business
activities of certain exempt organizations upon
the same tax basis as the nonexempt business
endeavors with which they compete.”).
72

See I.R.C. § 511.

73

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a).

74

I.R.C. § 513(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).

75

I.R.C. § 513(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).

76
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the activity with continuity and regularity
and . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for
engaging in the activity must be for income
or profit.”77 When applying this test, the
IRS may take into account a key purpose of
the unrelated business income tax: to
prevent unfair competition between taxable
and tax-exempt entities.
“[W]here an
activity does not possess the characteristics
of a trade or business within the meaning of
section 162, such as when an organization
sends out low cost articles incidental to the
solicitation of charitable contributions, the
unrelated business income tax does not
apply since the organization is not in
competition with taxable organizations.”78
The most important element as to
whether the activity is a trade or business is
the presence of a profit motive. In the
context of a tax-exempt organization, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared that the
inquiry should be whether the activity “‘was
entered into with the dominant hope and
intent of realizing a profit.’”79 Significant
weight is given to objective factors such as
whether the activity is similar to profitmaking activities conducted by commercial
enterprises.80 When the activity involved is
highly profitable and involves little risk,
courts generally infer the presence of a
profit motive.81 The mere fact that the

activity is conducted as a fund-raising
activity of the charity is not sufficient to
conclude that the activity is not a trade or
business.82
2. Regularly Carried On Requirement. In
general, in determining whether a trade or
business is “regularly carried on,” one must
consider the frequency and continuity with
which the activities productive of income
are conducted, and the manner in which they
are pursued. Business activities are deemed
to be “‘regularly carried on’ if they manifest
a frequency and continuity, and are pursued
in a manner, generally similar to comparable
commercial activities of nonexempt
organizations.”83 For example, “[w]here
income producing activities are of a kind
normally
conducted
by
nonexempt
commercial organizations on a year-round
basis, the conduct of such activities by an
exempt organization over a period of only a
few weeks does not constitute the regular
carrying on of trade or business [sic].”84
Similarly, “income producing or fund
raising activities lasting only a short period
of time will not ordinarily be treated as
regularly carried on if they recur only
occasionally or sporadically.”85 However,
“[w]here income producing activities are of
a kind normally undertaken by nonexempt

77

Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35
(1987).
78
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). But see La. Credit
Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525,
542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he presence or absence
of competition between exempt and nonexempt
organizations does not determine whether an
unrelated trade or business is to be taxed.”).
79
United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477
U.S. 105, 110, n. 1 (1986) (quoting Brannen v.
Comm’r, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984).
80
Ill. Ass’n of Prof’l Ins. Agents v. Comm’r,
801 F.2d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1986).
81
See, e.g., Carolinas Farm & Power Equip.
Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d
167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no better
objective measure of an organization’s motive
for conducting an activity than the ends it
achieves.”); La. Credit Union League v. United
States, 693 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a profit motive existed based on the

fact that the organization was extensively
involved in endorsing and administering an
insurance program that proved highly profitable);
Fraternal Order of Police Ill. State Troopers
Lodge No. 41 v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 756
(1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987)
(reasoning that the organization’s advertising
activities were “obviously conducted with a
profit motive” because the activities were highly
lucrative and with no risk or expense to the
organization).
82
See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 115
(stating that a charity cannot escape taxation by
characterizing an activity as fundraising, because
otherwise “any exempt organization could
engage in a tax-free business by ‘giving away’
its product in return for a ‘contribution’ equal to
the market value of the product”).
83
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
84
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).
85
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii).
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commercial organizations only on a seasonal
basis, the conduct of such activities by an
exempt organization during a significant
portion of the season ordinarily constitutes
the regular conduct of trade or business.”86
In making this determination, it is
essential to identify the appropriate
nonexempt commercial counterpart to the
exempt organization’s activity, because the
manner in which the nonexempt commercial
counterpart conducts its similar activities
has an important bearing on whether the
activity is considered to be carried on yearround, on a seasonal basis or intermittently.
For example, a tax-exempt organization’s
annual Christmas card sales program was
determined to be regularly carried on when
conducted over several months during the
holiday
season
because,
although
nonexempt organizations normally conduct
the sale of greeting cards year-round, the
Christmas card portion of the nonexempt
organizations’ sales was conducted over the
same seasonal period.87 By contrast, when
an exempt organization’s fundraising
activities are conducted on an intermittent
basis, such activities are generally
considered not to be regularly carried on.88

Furthermore, in determining whether
an exempt organization’s business activities
are “regularly carried on,” the activities of
the organization’s agents may be taken into
account.89 Courts disagree as to whether an
exempt organization’s preparation time in
organizing and developing an incomeproducing activity may be taken into
account.90
3. Unrelated to the Charity’s Exempt
Purpose. In the event the charity’s
activities are determined to be regularly
carried on, the next inquiry is whether such
activities are related to the charity’s
purposes which constitute the basis for its
exemption.91 This in an inherently factual
determination. To determine whether the
business activity is “related,” the
relationship between the conduct of the
business activities that generate the income
and
the
accomplishment
of
the
organization’s exempt purposes must be
examined to determine whether a causal
relationship exists.92 The activity will not be
substantially related merely because the
income produced from the activity is used to
further
the
organization’s
exempt
93
purposes. Rather, the inquiry focuses on
the manner in which the income is earned.
Thus, a substantial causal relationship exists

86

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dept. of Mich. v.
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 7, 32-37 (1987).
88
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii) (stating
fundraising activities lasting only a short period
of time will generally not be regarded as
regularly carried on, despite their recurrence or
their manner of conduct); Suffolk County
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r,
77 T.C. 1314 (1981), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2
(determining that the conduct of an annual
vaudeville show one weekend per year and the
solicitation and publication of advertising in the
related program guide which lasted eight to
sixteen weeks per year was intermittent and not
regularly carried on). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.5131(c)(2)(ii) (“[E]xempt organization business
activities which are engaged in only
discontinuously or periodically will not be
considered regularly carried on if they are
conducted without the competitive and
promotional efforts typical of commercial
endeavors.”)
87

89

State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 72
T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1996), aff’d, 125 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997).
90
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456 (1989) (finding that
NCAA’s sale of advertisements for annual
championship program was “regularly carried
on,” in part because of the amount of preliminary
time spent to solicit advertisements and prepare
them for publication), rev’d, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that this activity was not
regularly carried on, because only the time spent
conducting the activity, not the time spent in
preparations, is relevant to that determination);
A.O.D. 1991-015 (indicating that the IRS will
continue to litigate the issue).
91
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).
92

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).

93

I.R.C. § 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).
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if the distribution of the goods from which
the income is derived contributes
importantly to the accomplishment of the
organization’s exempt purposes.94 In each
case, the determination of whether this
relationship exists depends on the facts and
circumstances involved. In making this
determination, the size and extent of the
activities involved are considered in relation
to the nature and extent of the exempt
functions they are serving.95 If the activities
are conducted on a scale larger than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the
exempt purposes, the income attributed to
the excess activities constitutes unrelated
business income.96

1. Passive Activities Generally.
The
purpose of the unrelated business income tax
is to eliminate the conduct of unrelated
businesses by tax exempt organizations as a
source of unfair competition with for-profit
companies. To the extent that income of a
tax exempt organization is derived from
investment and other passive activities, the
taxation of such income is not necessary to
accomplish this goal. Accordingly, the
modifications to the unrelated business
income tax exclude most passive income, as
well as the deductions associated with such
passive income, from the scope of the tax.100
In particular, the following types of passive
income are excluded from unrelated
business taxable income:
i.
dividends;101
ii.
interest;102
iii. annuities;103
iv. payments
with
respect
to
104
securities loans;
v.
amounts received or accrued as
consideration for entering into
agreements to make loans;105
vi. royalties;106

B. Exceptions and Modifications. The
term “unrelated trade or business” is subject
to several exceptions under which certain
businesses that may otherwise constitute
unrelated businesses are removed from the
scope of the tax. In particular, the term
“unrelated trade or business” does not
include a trade or business in which
substantially all the work in carrying on the
trade or business is performed for an
organization
without
compensation.97
Unlike the other exceptions, the “volunteer
exception” is not restricted as to the nature
of the businesses to which it pertains. In
addition, the term “unrelated trade or
business” does not include the trade or
business
of
selling
merchandise,
substantially all of which has been received
by the organization as gifts or
contributions.98 Finally, an exception from
the unrelated business income tax is also
provided for income derived from the
distribution of low cost articles incident to
the solicitation of charitable contributions.99
94

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2).

95

See I.R.C. § 511.

to the organization of $9.90 or less. Rev. Proc.
2011-52, 2011-45 I.R.B.
100
See generally Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
101
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
102
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
103
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
104
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). The term “payments with
respect to securities loans,” refers to income
derived from a securities lending transaction in
which an exempt organization loans securities
from its portfolio to a broker in exchange for
collateral. I.R.C. § 512(a)(5). Payments derived
from a securities lending transaction typically
include interest earned on the collateral and
dividends or interest paid on the loaned
securities while in the possession of the broker.
105
I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
106
I.R.C. § 512(b)(2). A royalty is defined as a
payment that relates to the use of a valuable
right, such as a name, trademark, trade name or
copyright. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.
By contrast, the payment for personal services
does not constitute a royalty. Id.

96

Id.
I.R.C. § 513(a)(1).
98
I.R.C. § 513(a)(3).
99
I.R.C. § 513(h). For tax years beginning in
2012, a low-cost article is one which has a cost
97
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not constitute rent from real property.113 As
a general rule, services are considered to be
rendered to the occupant if the services are
(a) primarily for the convenience of the
occupant, and (2) other than those usually or
customarily rendered in connection with the
rental of rooms or other space for occupancy
only.114

vii.

gains or losses from the sale,
exchange, or other disposition of
property other than inventory;107
and
viii. gains or losses recognized in
connection with a charitable
organization’s
investment
activities from the lapse or
termination of options to buy or
sell securities or real property.108

3. Royalties.
Because royalties are
passive in nature, the receipt of royalty
income by a tax-exempt organization does
not result in unfair competition with taxable
entities.115 Accordingly, section 512 of the
Code provides that a charity’s UBTI
generally does not include royalties.116 A
royalty is defined as a payment that relates
to the use of a valuable right, such as a
name,
trademark,
trade
name,
or
copyright.117 The royalty may be in the form
of a fixed fee or a percentage of sales of the
products bearing the charity’s name and
logo. In addition, the tax-exempt
organization may retain the right to approve
the use of its name or logo without changing
the determination that the income from the
transaction is a royalty.
Of particular importance in the royalty
context is the amount of services the charity
performs in exchange for the payment
received. In order to maintain the royalty
exemption for the payments received, the
charity may not perform more than de
minimis services in connection with the
arrangement.118 If the charity performs

2. Rents. In addition, certain rents are
excluded from unrelated business taxable
income.109 The exclusion applies to rents
from real property and rents from personal
property leased with such real property,
provided that the rents attributable to the
personal property are an incidental amount
of the total rents received or accrued under
the lease.110 Three principal exceptions limit
the ability of a charitable organization to
exclude the eligible rents described above
from unrelated business taxable income.
The exceptions apply when there are
excessive personal property rents, when rent
is determined by net profits from the
property, and when certain services are
rendered to the lessee. Under the first
exception, the rental exclusion does not
apply if more than 50% of the total rent
received or accrued under the lease is
attributable to personal property, determined
at the time the personal property is first
placed in service.111 Under the second
exception, the rental exclusion is not
available if the determination of the amount
of rent depends in whole or in part on the
income or profits derived by any person
from the leased property, other than an
amount based on a fixed percentage or
percentages of receipts or sales.112 Under
the third exception, payments for the use or
occupancy of rooms or other space where
services are also rendered to the occupant do
107
108
109
110
111
112

more than insubstantial services, then the
income
received
is
considered
compensation for personal services, the
royalty exception would not apply, and

113

Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5).
Id.
115
See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d
1526, 1533 (9th Cir. 1996).
116
I.R.C. § 512(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)1(b). A charity’s UBTI would include royalties
derived from debt-financed property. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.512(b)-1(b).
117
Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.
118
Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1533–35.
114

I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(5).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(A).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(i).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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the income would most likely be subject
to tax as UBTI.119

cases, the Internal Revenue Service has
determined that “mere” quality control does
not constitute more than insubstantial
services related to the royalty income.121 In
other cases, a charity’s “quality control” was
recharacterized as services, resulting in the
income from the arrangement being taxed as
compensation from services rather than
exempted as royalty income.122 Therefore,
charities are left to struggle with the
determination of the permissible types of
“quality control” they can include in their
licensing agreements without crossing the
boundary between de minimis and
substantial services.
Furthermore, caution should be taken in
relying on the royalty exception for income
received from the licensing of a charity’s
name or logo for placement on a corporate
sponsor’s product.
In evaluating the
justification for the continued tax exemption
for college athletic programs, the
Congressional Budget Office recommended
repealing the royalty exception to the extent
that it applies to the licensing of a charity’s
name or logo:

For example, the Internal Revenue
Service privately ruled that royalties
received by a charity from the license of the
charity’s intellectual property to a for-profit
company for use in the company’s
commercial activities were excluded from
the charity’s UBTI under the royalty
exception.120 Under the license agreement,
the charity retained the right to review the
designs and proposed uses of the charity’s
intellectual property, inspect the commercial
counterpart’s facilities where the product
was manufactured, and inspect the
commercial counterpart’s books and records
annually. The Internal Revenue Service
determined that these services performed by
the charity in connection with the licensing
arrangement were de minimis. Moreover, the
licensing agreement was narrowly tailored
to protect the charity’s ownership of its
intellectual property by giving the charity
absolute discretion to reject proposed uses of
the property, providing notice on every unit
displaying the charity’s mark that it was
used with the charity’s permission, and
allowing the charity to approve and limit
mass media advertising of the product. The
Internal Revenue Service concluded that the
income that the charity would receive from
the arrangement was “vastly out of
proportion with the time and effort” the
charity would expend. Therefore, it could
only be compensation for the use of the
charity’s intellectual property.
The determination of the permissible
amount of “insubstantial services” is
uncertain, however, especially in connection
with the charitable organization’s exercise
of quality control over the use of its name,
logo, and trademarks. As is prudent business
practice, a charity would want to maintain
quality control over the use of its name,
logo, and trademark by the corporate partner
under the licensing agreement. In some
119
120

Some types of royalty income may
reasonably be considered more
commercial than others. . . . [W]hen
colleges and universities license team
names, mottoes, and other trademarks
to for-profit businesses that supply
apparel, accessories, and credit cards to
the general public, they approve each
product and use of their symbols and,
in some cases, exchange information,
such as donor lists, with the licensees
to aid in their marketing. . . . The
manufacture or sale of such items
would clearly be commercial—and
subject to the UBIT—if undertaken
directly by the schools. Schools’ active
involvement in generating licensing
income could be the basis for
considering
such
income
as
121

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135;
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9029047 (Apr. 27, 1990)
122
See, e.g., NCAA v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456,
468–70 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 914 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1990); Fraternal Order of Police
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 758 (1986), aff’d, 833
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987).

See Rev. Rul. 81-178.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005).
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payment” is “any payment125 by any person
engaged in a trade or business with respect
to which there is no arrangement or
expectation that the person will receive any
substantial return benefit.”126 A “substantial
return benefit” is any benefit other than a
“use or acknowledgement”127 of the
corporate sponsor and certain disregarded
benefits.128 Substantial benefits include the
charitable organization’s provision of
facilities, services, or other privileges to the
sponsor; exclusive provider relationships;129

commercial and therefore subject to
the UBTI. . . .
Bringing royalty income that accrues
only to athletic departments under the
UBIT
would
be
problematic,
however . . . . [I]f royalty income from
licensing team names to for-profit
businesses was truly considered
commercial and subject to the UBIT,
the same arguments would apply in
full force to licensing all other
university names and trademarks. A
consistent policy would subject all
such income to the UBIT because of
its commercial nature. Such a change
in policy could affect many other
nonprofits in addition to colleges and
universities . . . .123

125

“Payment” means “the payment of money,
transfer of property, or performance of services.”
Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1).
126
Id. For purposes of these rules, it is irrelevant
whether the sponsored activity is temporary or
permanent. Id
127
The permitted “uses or acknowledgements”
under the qualified sponsorship payment rules
include (i) “logos and slogans that do not contain
qualitative or comparative descriptions of the
payor’s products, services, facilities or
company,” (ii) “a list of the payor’s locations,
telephone numbers, or Internet address,” (iii)
“value-neutral descriptions, including displays or
visual depictions, of the payor’s product-line or
services,” and (iv) “the payor’s brand or trade
names and product or service listings.” Id.
§ 1.513-4(c)(1)(iv). “Logos or slogans that are an
established part of the payor’s identity are not
considered to contain qualitative or comparative
descriptions.” Id.
128
Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2). A benefit is disregarded
if “the aggregate fair market value of all the
benefits provided to the payor or persons
designated by the payor in connection with the
payment during the organization’s taxable year is
not more than two percent of the amount of the
payment.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(ii). If this limit is
exceeded, the entire benefit (and not just the
amount exceeding the two percent threshold)
provided to the payor is a substantial return
benefit. Id.
129
The Treasury Regulations define an
“exclusive provider” relationship as any
arrangement which “limits the sale, distribution,
availability, or use of competing products,
services or facilities in connection with an
exempt organization’s activity.” Id. § 1.5134(c)(2)(vi)(B). “For example, if in exchange for a
payment, the exempt organization agrees to
allow only the payor’s products to be sold in

4. Corporate Sponsorships.
Under
section 513(i) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the receipt of qualified sponsorship
payments by a charity does not constitute
the receipt of income from an unrelated
trade or business, and instead, the payment
is treated as a charitable contribution to the
charity.124
A
“qualified
sponsorship

123

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3005, TAX
PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS 13
(2009).
124
I.R.C. § 513(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a). The
Treasury Regulations provide the following
example of a qualified sponsorship payment:
M, a local charity, organizes a
marathon and walkathon at which it
serves to participants drinks and
other refreshments provided free of
charge by a national corporation.
The corporation also gives M
prizes to be awarded to the winners
of the event. M recognizes the
assistance of the corporation by
listing the corporation’s name in
promotional fliers, in newspaper
advertisements of the event and on
T-shirts worn by participants. M
changes the name of its event to
include the name
of the
corporation.
M’s
activities
constitute acknowledgement of the
sponsorship.
Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 1.
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and any license to use intangible assets of
the charitable organization.130 “If there is an
arrangement or expectation that the payor
will receive a substantial return benefit with
respect to any payment, then only the
portion, if any, of the payment that exceeds
the fair market value of the substantial
return benefit is a qualified sponsorship
payment.”131 The exempt organization has
the burden of establishing the fair market
value of the substantial return benefit. If the
organization fails to do so, “no portion of
the payment constitutes a qualified
sponsorship payment.”132
The tax treatment of any payment that
does not represent income from a qualified
sponsorship payment is governed by general
UBIT principles.133 The mere fact that the
payments are received in connection with
the corporate sponsor receiving a substantial
return benefit does not necessitate the
payments constituting UBTI. For example,
in a memorandum released by the Internal
Revenue Service in October 2001, examples
of certain exclusive provider relationships
were addressed.134 Significantly, one
example involved a contract between a soft
drink company and a university, under
which the soft drink company would be the
exclusive provider of soft drinks on campus
in return for an annual payment made to the
university. Exclusive provider relationships
are explicitly named as a substantial return
benefit; therefore, the arrangement did not
qualify as a qualified sponsorship payment.
Because the soft drink company maintained
the vending machines, there was no
obligation by the university to perform any
services on behalf of the soft drink company
or to perform any services in connection
with the contract. Accordingly, the

university did not have the level of activity
necessary to constitute a trade or business.
Since the contract also provided that the soft
drink company was given a license to
market its products using the university’s
name and logo, the portion of the total
payment attributable to the value of the
license would be excluded from the
university’s UBTI as a royalty payment.
If the corporate sponsorship involves
the charity’s endorsement of the corporate
sponsor’s product or services, then the
income from the corporate sponsorship will
likely be included in the charity’s UBTI as
advertising income. “Advertising” is “any
message or other programming material
which is broadcast or otherwise transmitted,
published, displayed or distributed, and
which promotes or markets any trade or
business, or any service, facility or
product.”135 Advertising includes “messages
containing qualitative or comparative
language, price information or other
indications of savings or value, an
endorsement, or an inducement to purchase,
sell, or use any company, service, facility or
product.”136 For example, the Internal
135

Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(v).
Id. Typically, advertising is considered to be a
trade or business that is unrelated to the charity’s
exempt purposes. Thus, the question remains
whether the advertising activity is “regularly
carried on.” If advertising messages of a
corporate sponsor’s product are continuously
present on the charity’s website, such advertising
activities would seem to be regularly carried on
and the revenues therefrom would thus constitute
UBTI. One counter-argument would appear to be
that the limited number of advertisements makes
the charity’s activities dissimilar in extent to
comparable commercial activities. See Tech.
Adv. Mem. 9417003 (Dec. 31, 1993) (stating
that an advertising campaign conducted by
placing advertisements in programs for an
organization’s annual ball was not typical of
commercial endeavors because solicitations for
advertisements were limited in number and
consisted of a single form letter). Given the
variety and relative novelty of Internet
advertisements, it would be unwise for a charity
to rely upon such a position. See generally I.R.S.
Announcement 2000-84, 2000-42 I.R.B. 385

136

connection with an activity, the payor has
received a substantial return benefit.” Id.
130
Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii)(D).
131
Id. § 1.513-4(d).
132
Id.
133
Id. § 1.513-4(f).
134
See IRS Issues Field Memo on Exclusive
Providers and UBIT, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY
192-26 (Oct. 3, 2001).
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Revenue Service considers the following
messages to consist, at least in part, of
advertising: (i) “This program has been
brought to you by the Music Shop, located
at 123 Main Street. For your music needs,
give them a call at 555-1234. This station is
proud to have the Music Shop as a
sponsor,”137 and (ii) “Visit the Music Shop
today for the finest selection of music CDs
and cassette tapes.”138 If a single message
contains
both
advertising
and
an
acknowledgement, the message is an
advertisement.
Where
the
Treasury
Regulations do not allow one to clearly
distinguish between advertisements and
permitted uses and acknowledgements, a
court may be inclined to take a commonsense approach and consider a message an
advertisement if it “looks like” an ad.139
The United States Supreme Court
considered whether advertising could be
substantially related to an organization’s
exempt purposes in United States v.
American College of Physicians,140 the
leading case on this topic. There, an exempt
physicians’ organization received income
from the sale of advertising in its
professional journal. The messages in
question consisted of advertisements for
“pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and
equipment useful in the practice of internal

medicine.” The organization “has a longstanding practice of accepting only
advertisements containing information about
the use of medical products, and screens
proffered advertisements for accuracy and
relevance to internal medicine.” The
organization
argued
that
these
advertisements were substantially related to
its exempt functions because they
contributed to the education of the journal’s
readers. At trial, experts testified that “drug
advertising performs a valuable function for
doctors by disseminating information on
recent developments in drug manufacture
and use.”141 Rejecting the organization’s
claim and ruling that the advertising income
was UBTI, the Supreme Court analyzed this
issue as follows:
[A]ll advertisements contain some
information, and if a modicum of
informative content were enough to
supply the important contribution
necessary to achieve tax exemption
for commercial advertising, it
would be the rare advertisement
indeed that would fail to meet the
test. Yet the statutory and
regulatory scheme, even if not
creating a per se rule against tax
exemption, is clearly antagonistic
to the concept of a per se rule for
exemption . . . . Thus, the Claims
Court properly directed its attention
to the College’s conduct of its
advertising business, and it found
the following pertinent facts:
The evidence is clear that
plaintiff did not use the
advertising to provide its
readers a comprehensive or
systematic presentation of any
aspect of the goods or services
publicized. Those companies
willing to pay for advertising
space got it; others did not.
Moreover, some of the
advertising was for established
drugs or devices and was
repeated from one month to
another, undermining the
suggestion that the advertising
was principally designed to
alert
readers
of
recent
developments . . . . Some ads

(announcing that the Internal Revenue Service
was considering whether clarification was
needed as to the application of the “regularly
carried on” requirement to business activities
conducted on the Internet).
137
Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 7.
138
Id. at example 8. Where a document can be
broken down into segments identified in the
Treasury Regulations, a court or the Internal
Revenue Service will likely analyze each
segment with reference to the rules set out above.
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9805001 (Oct. 7,
1997) (concluding that an “ad” did not rise to the
level of advertising when it consisted of a can of
a sponsor’s pet food made to look like a trophy
and included two slogans that had long been
used by the sponsor in its advertising).
139
See, e.g., State Police Ass’n of Mass. v.
Comm’r, 125 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997).
140
475 U.S. 834 (1986).

141

Id. at 847.
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even concerned matters that
had
no
conceivable
relationship to the College’s
tax-exempt purposes.
. . . This is not to say that the
College could not control its
publication of advertisements in
such a way as to reflect an intention
to contribute importantly to its
educational
functions.
By
coordinating the content of the
advertisements with the editorial
content of the issue, or by
publishing only advertisements
reflecting new developments in the
pharmaceutical
market,
for
example, perhaps the College could
satisfy the stringent standards
erected by Congress and the
Treasury.142

The term “specified payment” means any
interest, annuity, royalty, or rent paid to the
controlling organization.144 For purposes of
this rule, the term control means (1) in the
case of a corporation, ownership (by vote or
value) of more than 50% of the stock in a
corporation,145 or (2) in the case of a
partnership, ownership of more than 50% of
the profits interest or capital interest in a
partnership.146 In determining control, the
constructive ownership rules of Code
section 318 apply.147 If a partnership owns
stock in a corporation, ownership of the
corporation will be attributed to the partners
in the same proportion in which the partners
hold their interests in the partnership.148 In
addition, if a shareholder owns 50% or more
of the value of the stock in a corporation,
stock in another entity owned by the
corporation is considered as owned by its
shareholder
in
proportion
to
the
shareholder’s ownership interest in the
corporation.149
Code Section 318 is silent with
respect to applying attribution rules among
tax exempt organizations. On its face, Code
Section 318 does not seem to attribute
ownership in an entity from one nonstock

C.
Payments
Between
Controlled
Groups. When a charitable organization
receives a “specified payment” from another
entity which it controls, the payment is
treated as unrelated business income to the
extent the payment reduces the trade or
business income of the controlled entity.143
142

Id. at 848–50 (citation omitted). Several
cases and rulings follow the reasoning of
American College of Physicians. See, e.g., Minn.
Holstein-Frisian Breeders Ass’n v. Comm’r, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 1319 (1992) (holding that
advertisements that may have been of “incidental
benefit to breeders in running their day-to-day
operations” but that did not “contribute
importantly to improving the quality of the breed
of
Holstein-Friesian
cattle”
were
not
substantially related to a cattle breeding
organization’s exempt purposes); Fla. Trucking
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1039 (1986) (holding
that advertisements of products of particular
interest to the trucking industry did not bear a
substantial relationship to the exempt functions
of a trucking trade association); Rev. Rul. 82139, 1982-2 C.B. 108 (concluding that a bar
association’s publication of advertisements for
products and services used by the legal
profession was not substantially related to the
association’s exempt purposes).

on Aug. 17, 2006) received or accrued after Dec.
31, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2010. Under the
modified rule, only the excess payments – the
portion of the “qualifying specified payment”
received or accrued by the controlling
organization that exceeds the amount which
would have been paid or accrued if such
payment met the requirements prescribed under
Code section 482 – is included in the controlling
organization’s UBTI, and only to the extent such
excess payment reduces the trade or business
income of the controlled entity.
I.R.C. §
512(b)(13)(E).
144
145

I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(C).
I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(I).

146

I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(II).

147

I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D)(ii).

148

I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A).

149

I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).

143

I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(A). A modification to
this rule applies to “qualifying specified
payments” (i.e., specified payments made
pursuant to a binding written contract in effect
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tax exempt organization to another because
the attribution rules focus on one’s
ownership interest in an organization.
Ownership is not an appropriate criterion for
tax exempt organizations because no one has
an ownership interest in a nonstock tax
exempt organization. For example, if two
tax exempt organizations, which have
identical boards of directors, each own a
50% interest in a for-profit corporation, the
constructive ownership rules of Code
Section 318 would not seem to attribute the
ownership of the corporation’s stock from
one of the tax exempt organizations to the
other.150 Thus, since both tax exempt
entities would own only 50% of the
corporation’s stock, the corporation would
not be controlled by either tax exempt
organization.151 As a result, interest paid
from the for-profit corporation to the tax
exempt shareholders would not be
considered unrelated business income.
However, by analogizing the
principles of former Code Section
512(b)(13), ownership in an entity by one
tax-exempt organization may be attributed
to another tax-exempt organization if there
is a common degree of management
between
the
two
tax-exempt
organizations.152
Former Code Section
512(b)(13) defined control by reference to
Code Section 368(c) which provides that
ownership of at least 80% of the
corporation’s stock effectuated control.153
In applying the principles of Section 368(c),
Treasury
Regulation
Section

1.512(b)-1(l)(4)(i)(b) states that in the
context
of
nonstock
tax-exempt
organizations, control exists between two or
more tax-exempt organizations in which
more than 50% of the governing boards
overlap.154
D. Unrelated Debt Financed Income.
Property
acquired
by
an
exempt
organization with borrowed funds may be
considered debt-financed property.155 Debtfinanced property is property held by a
charitable organization to produce income
that is encumbered by acquisition
indebtedness at any time during the taxable
year.156
The
term
“acquisition
indebtedness” refers to acquisition or
indebtedness incurred in connection with the
acquisition or improvement of property,
whether the debt is incurred before, after, or
at the time of acquisition.157 There are
several exceptions to the term acquisition
indebtedness, including exceptions for
property acquired by gift, bequest, or devise,
indebtedness incurred in performing the
organization’s exempt function, and certain
real property acquired by educational
organizations, qualified plans, and multipleparent title holding organizations.158
Exceptions under which property acquired
with financing escapes classification as
debt-financed property include property
used by an organization in performing its
exempt function, property used in an
unrelated trade or business, and property
acquired for prospective exempt use.159
A certain portion of income derived
from debt-financed property must be
included in unrelated business taxable
income as an item of gross income derived
from an unrelated trade or business.160
Similarly, a certain portion of the deductions

150

Robert A. Wexler & Lisa R. Appleberry,
TRA ‘97 Brings Charities a Little Relief . . . and
Maybe a Lot of Grief, 87 J. TAX’N 360, 363
(1997).
151

See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(D).

152

154

See Wexler & Appleberry, supra note 150 at
363; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199941048 (Oct. 18,
1999).

155
156
157

153

158

Former I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (repealed by P.L.
105-34 § 1041(a)) (effective for tax years
beginning before August 6, 1997).

159
160

Wexler & Appleberry, supra note 150 at 363.
I.R.C. § 514(b).
I.R.C. § 514(b)(1).
I.R.C. § 514(c)(1).
I.R.C. § 514(c).
I.R.C. § 514(b)(1), (3).
I.R.C. § 514(a)(1).
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directly connected with debt-financed
property are allowed as deductions in
computing unrelated business taxable
income.161 The portion of income and
deduction that must be taken into account is
determined by applying a debt/basis
percentage, which is equal to the ratio of the
average acquisition indebtedness for the
taxable year with respect to the property
over the average amount of the adjusted
basis of the property during the period it is
held by the organization during the taxable
year.162
The treatment of income and
deductions from debt-financed property
described above overrides the modifications
from unrelated business taxable income
otherwise provided for dividends, interest,
payments with respect to securities loans,
annuities, loan commitment fees, royalties,
rents, and gains and losses from the sale,
exchange, or other disposition of property.163
In other words, the amount ascertained
under the debt-financed property rules is
expressly required to be included as an item
of gross income derived from an unrelated
trade or business despite the fact that the
source of such income is passive in nature.

Technical
Advice
Memorandum
9651001 indicates that the use of multiple
pass-through entities does not change this
result.165 There, an exempt organization
(“X”) held an interest in a limited
partnership (“Z”). Z in turn owned an
interest in a joint venture (“Venture”).
Venture owned property that was collateral
for a mortgage note. X eventually sold its
interest in Z. The issue in the Technical
Advice Memorandum was whether this sale
was subject to unrelated business income tax
under Section 511 of the Code because Z
owned debt-financed property. The IRS
concluded that it was, explaining, “[a]n
interest in a partnership that holds
debt-financed property is effectively an
interest in the underlying assets and
liabilities of the partnership. An anomalous
result would occur if ownership of
debt-financed property through a partnership
would result in one tax treatment when
direct ownership would result in another.”
Under this reasoning, the same result
follows if the income in question was
derived from debt-financed property other
than through a sale of the exempt entity’s
interest in a pass-through entity. Regardless
of how many layers of pass-through entities
are imposed, the “lowest level” entity’s
property would effectively be owned by
each entity up the line, and would ultimately
effectively be owned by the tax exempt
entity.
To avoid the realization of debtfinanced income through an investment in a
limited partnership or hedge fund, charitable
organizations often use “blocker” entities to
acquire these investments. A “blocker”
entity is a corporate entity that is interposed
between the investment and the charitable
organization. The corporation “blocks” the
attribution of any debt in the investment
partnership to the charitable organization,
and thus enables the charitable organization
to avoid the application of the debt-financed

E. Partnerships. Section 702(b) of
the Code provides that the character in the
hands of a partner of an item of partnership
income is determined as if the item were
realized directed from the source from
which realized by the partnership. For
example, if an entity’s share of partnership
income is derived from debt-financed
property, the income from the property is
generally
taxable
as
debt-financed
164
income.
161

I.R.C. § 514(a)(2).
I.R.C. § 514(a)(1).
163
I.R.C. § 512(b)(4).
164
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-197, 1974-1 C.B. 143.
Example 4 in Treasury Regulation Section
1.514(c)-1(a)(2) specifically demonstrates that
this is so. Treas. Reg. § 1.514(c)-1(a)(2),
example 4.
Relying upon Section 702(b),
Example 4 explains that if an entity (“X”) is a
limited partner in a partnership that borrows
money to purchase an office building for lease to
162

the general public, X’s share of the income from
the building is debt-financed income. Id.
165
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9651001 (Dec. 20, 1996).
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income rules with respect to the investment
income generated by the investment
partnership. Rather, the partnership income
is taxed to the corporate blocker entity.
Often, the blocker entity is a foreign
corporation formed in a low tax jurisdiction.
As a result, the blocker entity pays little or
no tax on the income from the investment
partnership or hedge fund. The blocker
entity in turn distributes the income received
from the investment partnership to the
charitable organization in the form of
dividends, which is excluded from the
charitable organization’s unrelated business
taxable income.166 The IRS has issued a
private letter ruling determining that
dividends received by a charitable
organization from a foreign corporation used
as a blocker entity is not subject to the
unrelated business income tax.167 Although
the use of blocker entities may appear to be
a “loophole,” blocker entities are often used
to avoid the application of the unrelated
debt-financed income rules to passive
investments that were never intended to be
within the scope of the rules.

charitable organization with respect to the
stock.171
G. Public Disclosure of Information
Relating to the Unrelated Business Income
Tax. Charitable organizations are required
to make their annual Form 990/Form 990PF
information returns and exemption materials
available
for
public
inspection.172
Organizations that have unrelated business
income also have to file a Form 990-T
return. Charitable organizations described
in Section 501(c)(3)173 are required to make
their Form 990-T returns174 available for
public inspection.175 Certain information
may be withheld by the charitable
organization from public disclosure and
inspection (e.g., information relating to a
trade secret, patent, process, style of work,
or apparatus of the charitable organization)
if the Secretary determines that public
disclosure of such information would
adversely
affect
the
charitable
organization.176 Under the commensurate in
scope test, an exempt organization may
generate a significant amount of UBTI so
long as it performs charitable programs that
are commensurate in scope with its financial
resources.177
However, if a substantial
portion of the charity’s income is from

F. S Corporations. Charities are
able to hold S corporation shares without
breaking the S election.168 However, all
income distributable to a charitable S
corporation shareholder will be treated as
unrelated business taxable income from an
asset deemed in its entirety to be an interest
in
unrelated
trade
or
business.169
Consequently, “(i) all items of income, loss,
or deduction taken into account under
Section 1366(a), and (ii) any gain or loss on
the disposition of the stock in the S
corporation shall be taken into account in
computing the unrelated business taxable
income of such organization.”170
In
addition, the basis of any S corporation
stock acquired by purchase is reduced by the
amount of dividends received by the
166
167
168
169
170

171

I.R.C. § 512(e)(2).
I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A).
173
This requirement applies to all charitable
organizations which file Form 990-T returns,
regardless of whether such organizations are also
required to file annual Form 990/Form 990PF
information returns. However, state colleges and
universities which are exempt from income tax
solely under Section 115 of the Code are not
required to make their Form 990-T returns
available for public inspection. Notice 2007-45,
2007-22 I.R.B. 1320.
174
An exact copy of the Form 990-T return,
including all schedules, attachments and
supporting documents must be disclosed. Notice
2007-45, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1320.
175
I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii).
176
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th
Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The
“Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06
(Aug. 3, 2006) at 330.
177
Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186.
172

See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199952086 (Sept. 30, 1999).
See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(6).
I.R.C. § 512(e).
Id.
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unrelated activities, the organization fails to
qualify for exemption.178

One advantage of this structure is that
the activities of the taxable subsidiary
normally will not be attributed to the charity.
This is especially important if the conduct of
the activity is so substantial that it may
jeopardize the charity’s tax-exemption.
Second, the charity will not be required to
file a Form 990-T related to the activity,
which is available for public inspection.
Although the taxable subsidiary will file a
Form 1120, such form is not required to be
made publicly available. Third, use of a
taxable subsidiary can protect the charity’s
assets from liabilities arising from the
conduct of the unrelated business activity
and isolate those liabilities to the taxable
subsidiary. Finally, a taxable subsidiary can
provide greater flexibility in structuring the
unrelated business activity.
However, use of a taxable subsidiary
may increase administrative burdens and
costs of the charity. Additionally, the
dividends from the taxable subsidiary may
no longer be exempt from UBIT if the
charity transfers debt-financed property to
the taxable subsidiary.181 If the charity
provides administrative services to its
taxable subsidiary for a fee, the IRS may
reallocate income between the charity and
the taxable subsidiary under Code section
482. Finally, as discussed above, if the
charity receives interest, rent, annuity
payments or royalties from its controlled
taxable subsidiary, such payment may be
treated as unrelated business income to the
charity to the extent the payment reduces the
trade or business income of the taxable
subsidiary.182

H. Effect of Unrelated Business Activities
on the Charity’s Tax-Exempt Status. In
order to obtain and maintain tax-exempt
status, a charity must be operated primarily
for the purposes described in Section
501(c)(3) of the Code. Accordingly, if a
charity engages in too much unrelated
business activity, it risks the loss of its taxexempt status as no longer satisfying this
operational test. There is no bright line rule
with respect to how much unrelated business
income a charity may receive without
jeopardizing its tax-exempt status.179
Whether an organization has a substantial
non-exempt purpose is a question of fact.180
I.
Use of Taxable Subsidiaries. If a
charity engages in an activity that may
produce substantial unrelated business
income, the charity should consider
conducting the activity through a taxable
corporate subsidiary wholly owned by the
charity. The taxable subsidiary will be
responsible for paying income tax on the net
taxable income from the activity. The net
income may then be distributed to the
charity in the form of dividends which
generally are excluded from a charity’s
UBTI.
178

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
In making this determination, courts may
examine the amount of time or money spent on
carrying out an unrelated trade or business. See
Orange County Agricultural Society v. Comm’r,
893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g 55 T.C.M.
1602 (1988) (denying exempt status where an
organization received approximately one-third of
its gross income from unrelated business
activities).
180
See Better Business Bureau of Washington,
D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945)
(holding that the presence of a single, nonexempt purpose, if substantial in nature, will
destroy exemption regardless of the number of
importance of truly exempt purposes); B.S.W.
Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978);
Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558,
559 (1994), aff'd, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994).
179

V. Cause-Related Marketing.183 Causerelated marketing involves a charity forming
181

I.R.C. § 357(c); Rev. Rul. 77-71, 1977-1 C.B.
155.

182

I.R.C. § 512(b)(13).
Portions of this discussion on cause-related
marketing are extracted from the author’s
previously published article, The Taxation of
Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV.
883 (2010).
183
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alliances with one or more for-profit
corporations to allow the charity’s name or
logo to be used in marketing the
corporation’s products or services.184 Such
alliances may include selling merchandise
which prominently displays the charity’s
name, logo, or trademark message in
conjunction with a corporate partner or
allowing the charity’s name or logo to be
displayed on promotional products of the
corporate partner, with a portion of the sales
proceeds of those promotional products
donated to the charity.
Cause-related
marketing alliances provide mutual benefits
to the charity and the corporate partner.
Charities benefit by the amount of donations
received directly from the campaign and by
increasing resources and awareness of the
charity and its mission.185 The corporate
partners benefit because cause-related
marketing activities are generally profit
motivated, with donations based upon
consumer behavior in the form of
purchasing the sponsoring company’s
products or services.186 When a charity
engages in a cause-related marketing
alliance, the charity must carefully structure
the alliance or the income the charity
receives from the alliance may be treated as
unrelated business income.

merchandise bearing the charity’s name,
logo, or other cause-related message would
analyze whether the receipts from the sale of
such merchandise are UBTI under the
general three-prong UBTI test. The sale of
the merchandise typically is an activity
carried on for the production of income from
the sale of goods. Additionally, a charity
would normally engage in the sales of the
merchandise continuously throughout the
year.
Accordingly, the sale of the
merchandise would be considered a
regularly carried on trade or business.
Whether the receipts from the sale of the
merchandise are UBTI would depend on
whether the sale of the merchandise is
substantially related to the charity’s exempt
purpose.
Where a charity sells merchandise, the
merchandise is examined on an item-byitem basis to determine if sales of such
merchandise further the organization’s
exempt purposes.187
Generally, if the
primary purpose of an item is utilitarian,
ornamental, or token, selling such an item is
not
substantially
related
to
the
organization’s exempt purposes.188
In
contrast, if the utilitarian aspects of the item
are incidental to the item’s relationship to
the organization’s exempt purpose, the sale
of such an item is considered to be
substantially related to the organization’s
exempt purpose.189 In addition, merely
placing an exempt organization’s name or
logo on an item otherwise unrelated to its
exempt purpose will not prevent sales
proceeds from constituting UBTI.190
However, in several private rulings, the
Internal Revenue Service has reached the
contrary conclusion regarding the sale of tshirts and similar items bearing an

A. Sale of Merchandise Directly by
Charity. A charity which directly sells
184

See, e.g. Dennis R. Young, Commercialism in
Nonprofit Social Service Associations: Its
Character, Significance, and Rationale, in TO
PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 195, 198 (Burton A.
Weisbrod ed., 1998) (defining cause-related
marketing as involving “‘a relationship which
ties a company, its customers and selected
products to an issue or cause with the goal of
improving sales and corporate image while
providing substantial income and benefits to the
cause’” (citation omitted)).
185
See Stacy Landreth Grau & Judith Anne
Garretson Folse, Cause-Related Marketing
(CRM): The Influence of Donation Proximity
and Message-Framing Cues on the LessInvolved Consumer, J. ADVERTISING, Winter
2007, at 19, 20.
186
Id.

187

See e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9720002 (Nov. 26,
1996).
188
See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200222030 (Mar. 4,
2002); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8024111 (Jan. 3, 1980).
189
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8605002 (Sept. 4,
1985); Tech. Adv. Mem. 832-009 (Mar. 30,
1983).
190
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 8326003 (Nov.
17, 1982).
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organization’s name or symbol when
additional facts indicated that the sales
furthered the organization’s exempt
purpose.191
Most recently, the Internal Revenue
Service privately ruled in 2007 that the sale
of merchandise bearing the symbol for
breast cancer awareness by a charity formed
to educate the general public about early
detection of breast cancer was substantially
related to the charity’s exempt purpose.192
Thus, the proceeds from the sale of the
breast cancer awareness merchandise were
excluded from the charity’s UBTI. The
branded merchandise described in the ruling
included pins, apparel, home and office
products, jewelry, and special gifts. All
branded merchandise either displayed a pink
ribbon, the universal symbol for breast
cancer awareness, or were the color pink,
the universal color for breast cancer
awareness. Included with the packaging of
each item was a bookmark providing the
charity’s recommended three-step approach
to positive breast health and the charity’s
toll-free number and web address. The
Internal Revenue Service concluded that the
sale of the merchandise “reminds and
encourages those who wear, display, or see
the images, about breast cancer. The sale of
these items further enhances [the charity’s]
message that early detection of breast cancer
and positive breast health practice save lives
and is, accordingly, related to the
organization’s exempt purposes.”
Even though this type of merchandise
sold by a charity typically has some
utilitarian value, such as a t-shirt, hat,
wristband, or pin, it appears that if the
charity carefully links the sale of the
merchandise to the spreading of the charity’s
message, the sale of the merchandise may be
considered substantially related to the
charity’s exempt purpose.193 The charity’s

position would be significantly weakened if
the charity’s primary purpose in selling the
merchandise is to generate income.194
Internal Revenue Service interest in the sales
of the branded merchandise may increase as
the scope and extent of sales increase. The
Treasury Regulations provide that “[i]n
determining whether activities contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of an
exempt purpose, the size and extent of the
activities involved must be considered in
relation to the nature and extent of the
exempt function which they purport to
serve.”195 Therefore,
where income is realized by an
exempt
organization
from
activities that are in part related
to the performance of its exempt
functions, but which are
conducted on a larger scale than
is reasonably necessary for
performance of such functions,
[the gross income] of the
activities in excess of the needs
of the exempt functions
constitutes gross income from
the conduct of unrelated trade or
business.196
Thus, the more popular the branded
merchandise becomes, the more the sales of
the branded merchandise will increase and
the more likely the charity will become
subject to this type of attack.
B. Sale of Merchandise by Corporate
Partner. For sales of merchandise directly
by the corporate partner containing the
charity’s
name
or
logo,
different
considerations apply in determining whether
the income received by the charity from the
arrangement is excluded from the charity’s
UBTI. Many cause-related marketing
Revenue Service has accepted that appropriately
conducted sales of certain items to the public
through unrelated retailers do not result in UBTI.
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9550003 (Sept. 18, 1995).
194
See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm’r,
650 F.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
195
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3).
196
Id.

191

See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8633034 (May 20,
1986); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9436001 (Sept. 24,
1993).
192
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200722028 (Mar. 9, 2007).
193
Conducting sales through a third-party vendor
should not change this result. The Internal
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corporate partner.197 Since cause-related
marketing alliances grant the corporate
partner a license to use the charity’s name
and logo on the product, such a right would
be a substantial return benefit.198
Nonetheless, the portion, if any, of the
payment that exceeds the fair market value
of the license to use the charity’s name or
logo may still be a qualified sponsorship
payment.199
In conjunction with the corporate
partner’s use of the charity’s name or logo,
the charity may acknowledge the affiliation
on the charity’s website or printed materials.
Depending on how the charity describes its
affiliation with the corporate partner, the
“use or acknowledgement” exception may
not apply. The display of the logos and/or
slogans of the corporate partners are “uses
or acknowledgements.” The provision of
hyperlinks to various sponsors’ Internet sites
also
constitutes
merely
“uses
or
acknowledgements,” provided the sponsor’s
Internet site does not contain additional
statements indicating that the charity
promotes the sponsor or its products or
services.200 However, the provision of the
hyperlink to the sponsor’s website by the
charity may be for the purpose of
encouraging consumers to purchase the
merchandise from the sponsor because the
proceeds from those sales benefit the
charity. Since the corporate sponsorship
rules were not designed with cause-related
marketing activities in mind, they do not
address whether the charity’s motivation in
providing the link to the partner’s website
should be taken into account in determining
whether the charity is promoting the
sponsor’s products or services.

alliances involve recognition of the
corporate partner’s participation by the
charity on its website and in print materials.
Thus, this section first analyzes the possible
application of the corporate sponsorship
rules to cause-related marketing alliances.
Cause-related marketing alliances also
involve payment for the use of the charity’s
name, logo, or trademark; accordingly, this
section next analyzes the application of the
royalty exception to cause-related marketing
alliances. Finally, because consumer
perception of product endorsement by the
charity might be considered as a factor in the
UBTI analysis, this section analyzes whether
the income received from cause-related
marketing alliances could be included in
UBTI as advertising income.
1. Corporate sponsorship rules do not
(fully) address the issue. The corporate
sponsorship rules were enacted to address
the situation where the charity uses the
corporate sponsor’s logo on the charity’s
materials. Cause-related marketing alliances
typically involve the use of the charity’s
name or logo on the corporate partner’s
products. At first blush, the corporate
sponsorship exception seemingly would not
apply to cause-related marketing. However,
cause-related marketing alliances often
involve the charity’s recognition of the
alliance by acknowledging the corporate
partner on the charity’s website or print
materials. Therefore, a charity may claim
that at least a portion of the payment
received is a “sponsorship payment” and
attempt to treat that portion separately from
the other revenue received from the causerelated marketing alliance. In particular, this
may be the case where the alliance
guarantees the charity a minimum
“contribution” from the corporate partner
from the sale of the promotional
merchandise.
In order for a sponsorship payment
received by a charity to be excluded from
the charity’s UBTI as a qualified
sponsorship payment, the affiliation cannot
provide a substantial return benefit to the

197

See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1).
A “substantial return benefit” is any benefit
other than a “use or acknowledgement” of the
corporate sponsor. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2).
Importantly, substantial benefits include any
license to use intangible assets of the charitable
organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii).
199
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv).
200
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f), examples 11 & 12;
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200303062 (Oct. 22, 2002).
198
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joint advertisement of the product.203
Especially relevant in this analysis is
consumer
perception
of
apparent
endorsement of the product by the charity
because the charity has allowed its name and
logo to be placed on the product without
qualification. Although the licensing
agreement and official position of the
charity may state that the charity does not
endorse the product, the charity normally
retains the right to approve how its name
and logo are used on the product. By
approving the placement of its name and
logo on the product, the charity may be held
to the reasonable impressions such causerelated marketing leaves in the minds of
consumers. If the charity’s name and logo
are used in such a way as to give consumers
the impression that the charity endorses the
product, the charity may be deemed to have
endorsed the product. If the Internal
Revenue Service looks beyond the explicit
terms of the agreement to the manner in
which the agreement is carried out, the
payment may be considered advertising
income received by the charity and may no
longer be excluded from the charity’s UBTI.

2. Use of the charity’s name or logo may
(or may not) fit within the royalty exception.
Based on the success of taxpayers in
establishing royalty treatment for payments
for the use of the charity’s name and logo in
the affinity card context,201 it would seem
that the payments received by a charity for
the licensing of their name, logo, and
trademarks in connection with the sale of the
merchandise by the corporate partner should
also be considered royalties and thus exempt
from the charity’s UBTI. This result
presupposes that the charity is not
performing more than an insubstantial
amount of services in connection with the
licensing of the charity’s name, logo, and
trademarks. If the charity performs more
than insubstantial services, then the income
received is considered compensation for
personal services, the royalty exception
would not apply, and the income would
most likely be subject to tax as UBTI.202
However, the law is not clear that the
use of the charity’s name or logo on the
corporate partner’s products fits within the
royalty exception. If the charity’s name or
logo is placed on the corporate partner’s
product, the payment could instead be
viewed as received in connection with the

3. Revenue from cause-related marketing
may be advertising. Both the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service generally consider
the publication and distribution of
advertising by a charity to be unrelated to
the accomplishment of the charity’s exempt

201

See, e.g., Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass’n v.
Comm’r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999);
Common Cause v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 332
(1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1569 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).
Generally, an affinity credit card arrangement
provides that a credit card company may use the
exempt organization’s name in connection with a
credit card, and the organization will receive a
certain percentage, or “royalty,” from the income
generated by the credit card. Based on such
cases, the Internal Revenue Manual now
indicates that the Internal Revenue Service will
consider payments under affinity credit card
arrangements royalties as long as only minimal
services are provided by the exempt
organization’s members or employees. See
I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.27.6.7.3
(CCH 1999).
202
See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d
1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996).

203

Whether the placement of a charity’s name or
logo on a corporate partner’s product is a joint
advertisement is a fact specific determination. In
some cases, the association between the charity’s
mission and the corporate partner’s product is
such that it would be clear the charity is not
impliedly endorsing the corporate partner’s
product. In other cases, the charity’s mission and
the corporate partner’s product are so closely
aligned that it is unclear whether the charity
endorses the corporate partner’s product. The
issue is prevalent because the most successful
cause-related marketing alliances occur when the
charity’s mission and corporate partner’s
products are closely aligned.
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purposes.204
If the charity conducts
advertising activities on a regular basis, then
the advertising income generally is taxable
as unrelated business income.
Generally, displaying the charity’s
name or logo on the advertisement likely
would not be sufficient to cause the
advertising to be substantially related to the
charity’s exempt purposes. Although there
are no rulings or other primary authorities
considering receipts from advertisements
bearing an exempt organization’s name or
logo, the Internal Revenue Service has
considered receipts from the direct sale of
items bearing an exempt organization’s
name or logo. If the inclusion of the
charity’s name or logo on items directly sold
by the charity would not prevent receipts
from constituting UBTI, then a fortiori,
there is little reason to suppose that receipts
from advertisements of a third party’s
products or services which contain the
charity’s name or logo would not constitute
UBTI. However, as discussed above, the
Internal Revenue Service has on occasion
reached a contrary conclusion regarding the
sale of t-shirts and similar items bearing an
organization’s name or symbol, where
additional facts demonstrated how the items
furthered the organization’s exempt
function. If such additional facts are
present—for example, if the items
advertised
displayed
the
charity’s
message—this would be a positive factor.
Note, though, that the positive rulings would
still not be directly applicable to receipts
obtained from a sponsor for advertising a
product. One would need to closely examine
all of the facts and circumstances to
determine the extent to which the
advertising activity promoted the charity’s
message (as opposed to promoting the
corporate partner more generally), with
unpredictable results.

related marketing is to leverage the goodwill
of the charity in a joint campaign that
provides mutual benefits for the charity
(increased donations) and the corporate
partner (sale of the merchandise), but this
raises concerns about whether cause-related
marketing alliances produce impermissible
private benefit for the corporate partner.
Two examples addressing whether private
inurement (which is similar to private
benefit) has occurred are instructive in
determining whether the private benefit
argument would be applied to cause-related
marketing activities. General Counsel
Memorandum 37,289 provides the first
example; there, the Internal Revenue Service
concluded that a joint advertising campaign
carried on between a nonprofit organization
and a for-profit organization was not
indicative of private inurement. Although
the circumstances are somewhat unclear, it
appears that the for-profit organization
conducted all of the advertising while the
nonprofit organization paid a sales
commission. The Internal Revenue Service
reasoned that (i) the for-profit entity was not
capitalizing on the nonprofit’s goodwill
(because the nonprofit had only recently
been created) and (ii) joint advertising set up
a cost-efficient economy with quid pro quo
benefits to both entities. The Internal
Revenue Service distinguished Restland
Memorial Park v. United States—the second
example case—in which a joint advertising
campaign between a nonprofit cemetery
company and a for-profit entity did result in
private inurement, because the nonprofit
entity’s goodwill was used to benefit the forprofit entity.
An evaluation of whether the private
benefits received by the corporate partner
are more than incidental is difficult at best.
To be incidental, the benefit must be both
quantitatively and qualitatively incidental.
A benefit is quantitatively incidental if, after
considering the overall public benefit
conferred by the activity, the private benefit
is not substantial.
This requires a
comparison of the value of the private
benefit to the value of the public benefit of
the cause related-marketing alliance. Neither

C. Private Benefit Concerns of CauseRelated Marketing. The purpose of cause204

See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(iv),
example 7; United States v. Am. College of
Physicians , 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
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greatly from the publicity achieved in a
cause-related marketing alliance with a wellknown corporate partner. Such an alliance
could result in the charity becoming a
household name, possibly resulting is
additional individual donations to the
charity.
In contrast, a well-established
charity may not gain as much additional
public goodwill from a cause-related
marketing alliance with a well-known
corporate partner. Since the charity’s name
and message are already well-known,
increased publicity of the charity’s name or
message by the corporate partner may not
provide much additional benefit to the
charity.
In this scenario, rather, the
corporate partner may benefit more by
leveraging the existing public goodwill of
the well-known charity to promote increased
public goodwill for the corporate partner.
When a comparison of the benefits to
both the charity and the corporate partner
produces a substantial discrepancy in favor
of the corporate partner, the cause-related
marketing alliance would result in
impermissible private benefit. Yet, causerelated marketing activities on the whole are
generally not a significant part of the
charity’s activities. Therefore, revocation of
the charity’s tax-exempt status, the only
remedy currently available for violation of
the private benefit doctrine, is harsh and
likely unwarranted. Rather, concerns about
impermissible private benefit should be
factored into a safe harbor guidance that
identifies specific cause-related marketing
activities which would not jeopardize a
charity’s tax-exempt status.

valuation is easy. Some of the private
benefits to the corporate partner may be
quantifiable, such as increased sales or
revenues, but the value of many of the
benefits, such as enhanced corporate
goodwill, improved employee morale, and
increase in customer esteem, may be
difficult to value.
The benefit is incidental in the
qualitative sense if it is “a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the
public at large.” In other words, the activity
only can be accomplished by benefiting the
private party.
Cause-related marketing
alliances are viewed by the charity as a
means of fundraising. The application of this
test to fundraising activities is difficult as
the test was designed to be applied to the
carrying out of the organization’s charitable
activities. To be sure, fundraising is a
necessary activity of most charities. A literal
application of this test would appear to
prohibit any private benefit from fundraising
activities as long as it is possible to raise
funds without conferring any benefit on the
donors (i.e., by raising funds only from
purely gratuitous donations). Yet, in many
fundraising campaigns donors receive some
benefit in return, whether it be recognition
of their generosity or a trinket item that
donors can use or display to show their
support.
The end result of the private benefit
analysis is to compare the value of the
benefits flowing to the corporate partner
against the value of the benefits flowing to
the charity from the cause-related marketing
alliance. In addition to the monetary benefits
received from the cause-related marketing
alliance, the charity benefits in the form of
increased awareness of the charity’s
message and name recognition because the
charity gains publicity from the corporate
partner’s marketing efforts to promote the
alliance. The actual benefit of increased
publicity of the charity resulting from a
cause-related marketing alliance is hard to
quantify, and necessitates a fact specific
inquiry that may vary widely from one
charity to the next. For example, it may be
that a local unfamiliar charity can benefit

VI. Investment in Social Enterprises.
Social enterprises are businesses whose
primary purpose is the common good. Social
enterprises “use the methods and disciplines
of business and the power of the
marketplace to advance their social,
environmental
and
human
justice
agendas.”205 Key distinctions between a
205

Social Enterprise Alliance, What’s a Social
Enterprise, at https://www.se-alliance.org/whatis-social-enterprise; cf. Cassady V. (“Cass”)
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social enterprise and a charitable
organization include: (i) a social enterprise
may have individual owners who receive
periodic distributions of net earnings of the
social enterprise; (ii) a social enterprise
generally does not qualify for tax-exemption
as a charitable organization; and (iii) a social
enterprise is more flexible in its ability to
access capital markets and conduct its
activities to accomplish its purposes because
the social enterprise is not subject to the
restrictions
imposed
on
charitable
organizations under the Code.
Currently, researchers believe that over
50% of nonprofits have at least one or more
social enterprises,206 which makes UBIT an
important issue within many of them. In
addition, in the past few years, there has
been growth in social enterprise in the
nonprofit sector in the United States spurred
by a number of factors: reductions in
government funding, increased client need,
and interest in diversifying funding sources.
The social needs addressed by social
enterprises are widely diverse as well as the
business models employed by social
enterprises to accomplish their purposes.
Many states have created new
organizational forms for social enterprises,
including the low-profit limited liability
company (“L3C”).207 The L3C starts with

the traditional limited liability company
form and adds features that evidence the
L3C promotion of common good over
profit-maximization for its members.208 The
L3C is distinguished from a traditional
limited liability company by four core
elements: (i) the L3C must operate to
significantly further the accomplishment of
charitable or educational purposes; (ii) the
L3C would not have been formed but for its
relationship to the accomplishment of these
purposes; (iii) income production or capital
appreciation may not be a significant
purpose of the L3C; and (iv) the L3C may
not pursue purposes that would disqualify a
charity from exemption under the limitations
on lobbying activities and political
campaign activities imposed by the Code.209
The L3C statutes were designed to allow
private foundations to invest in properly
formed L3Cs as qualifying program-related
investments.210 Accordingly, the four core
elements
distinguishing
L3Cs
from
traditional limited liability companies were
derived primarily with this narrow focus in
mind.211
Another new state business form for
social enterprises gaining popularity is the
aws.php for links to the legislation in those states
adopting the L3C form.
208
See Reiser, supra note 207 at 621.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 622. A program-related investment
(“PRI”) must have as its primary purpose the
accomplishment of one or more charitable
purposes and no significant purpose may be the
production or income or capital appreciation.
I.R.C. § 4944(c). PRIs have a couple of distinct
advantages for private foundations. First, a PRI
is considered a qualifying distribution for
purposes of meeting the private foundation’s
minimum payout requirement to avoid the excise
tax on failure to distribute income. See I.R.C. §
4942. Second., a PRI is not subject to the excise
tax on jeopardizing investments applicable to
private foundations. See I.R.C. § 4944. The IRS
recently issued proposed regulations on PRIs
which contain new examples of permissible
PRIs, including investment in social enterprise.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3, example 11
and example 12.
211
See Reiser, supra note 207 at 623.

Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for
Quasi-Charitable Endeavors, 38 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 678, 679 (2012) (noting that “there is no
universally accepted legal meaning of the term
‘social enterprise.’”).
206
Social
Enterprise
Alliance,
Social
Enterprises: A Snapshot (Apr. 2009), available at
https://www.se-alliance.org/resources.
Most
organizations operate social enterprises as a
division of the parent organization. Id.
207

See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 619, 620 (2010). Legislation authorizing
the L3C form has been enacted in 9 states:
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and
Wyoming.
See Americans for Community
Redevelopment,
Legislation,
Laws
at
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/l
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benefit corporation.212 A benefit corporation
begins with the traditional state law
corporate form and makes modifications to
accomplish the following distinguishing
characteristics of a benefit corporation: (i) a
corporate purpose to create a material
positive impact on society and the
environment; (ii) expansion of the fiduciary
duties of directors to require consideration
of non-financial stakeholders as well as the
financial interests of its shareholders; and
(iii) an obligation to report on its overall
social and environmental performance using
a comprehensive, credible, independent and
transparent third-party standard.213
In contrast to the legislativelyapproved L3C and benefit corporation, the B
Corporation is a business form used for
social enterprises which is self-imposed and
privately regulated.214 A B Corporation
(also called a “for-benefit” corporation) uses
the existing state-law corporate form and
incorporates into its governing documents a
commitment to “uses the power of business
to solve social and environmental
problems.”215 B Lab, a private, nonprofit
organization reviews the company’s
structure and operations as part of its
certification process, and if the company is
certified by B Lab, the company may license
the “certified B Corporation” trademark

from B Lab.216 Often, benefit corporations
are referred to as “B Corporations;”
however, the benefit corporation is a
legislatively-approved business form while
the B Corporation is privately regulated.
A. UBIT Treatment for a Charity
Investing in a Social Enterprise. When a
charity invests in a social enterprise, the
potential UBIT treatment of the investment
to the charity will depend on the form of the
investment. For example, if the investment
is structured as a loan from the charity to the
social enterprise, then the interest that the
charity receives on the loan generally will be
excluded from the charity’s unrelated
business income as passive interest
income.217 Similarly, if the social enterprise
is formed as a corporation,218 such as a
benefit corporation or a B Corporation, and
the charity’s investment in the social
enterprise is structured as the acquisition of
shares of stock in the social enterprise, then
the dividend distributions the charity
receives from the corporation generally will
be excluded from the charity’s unrelated
business income as passive dividend
income.219 These interest and dividend
exclusions may not apply, however, to the
extent the interest or dividend income is
treated as unrelated debt-financed income.220
L3Cs generally are treated as a
partnership for federal income tax
purposes.221 Accordingly, the L3C does not
pay income tax on its net earnings. Rather,
the profits and losses of the L3C are

212

Legislation authorizing the benefit
corporation form has been enacted in 9 states:
California, Hawaii, Maryland, Louisiana, New
Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Virginia. See Benefit Corp Information Center,
State by State Legislative Status at
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-statelegislative-status for links to the legislation in
those states adopting the benefit corporation
form.
213
William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, The
Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation:
Why it is the Legal Form That Best Addresses
the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors,
and, Ultimately, the Public (Jan. 26, 2012), at 15,
at
http://www.benefitcorp.net/forattorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper.
214
Reiser, supra note 207 at 637.
215
B Lab, What is a B Corp? at
http://www.bcorporation.net/about.

216

See B Lab, Why Become a B Corp? at
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-Corp.
217
See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1); but see I.R.C. §
512(b)(13)(A)for an exception for certain interest
payments received from a controlled subsidiary.
218
The result is different if the corporation is
treated as an S corporation for federal income tax
purposes.
All income distributable to a
charitable S corporation shareholder is treated as
unrelated business taxable income from an asset
deemed in its entirety to be an interest in
unrelated trade or business. I.R.C. § 512(e).
219
See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
220
See generally I.R.C. § 514.
221
See Reiser, supra note 207 at 623-24.
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allocated to its members, each of whom
report and pay tax on the allocated profits
and losses in accordance with such
member’s own tax status.222 For example, if
a charity invests in a social enterprise that is
formed as a L3C, the charity would be
required to report its allocated items of
profit and loss from the L3C on the charity’s
Form 990.
To the extent the reported items of
income do not qualify for the passive
exclusions from the unrelated business
income tax (e.g., interest, dividends, rents,
and capital gains),223 then the charity
typically must apply the general three-prong
test to determine whether the income from
the business operated by the L3C is
unrelated business income for the charity.224
Usually, investment in the L3C will easily
meet the first two prongs: the activity
conducted by the L3C typically is a trade or
business and normally the activity is
regularly carried on.
Thus, the key
determinant is whether the activity
conducted by the L3C substantially furthers
the charitable purposes for which the
charitable investor was granted taxexemption.
This is a case by case
determination. Thus, even though a L3C
may operate to substantially further a
charitable purpose, if the L3C’s charitable
purpose is unrelated to the charitable
investor’s tax-exempt purpose, then the
income allocated to the charitable investor
from the L3C may not be exempt from that
charity’s UBTI.225 Accordingly, a charity
desiring to invest in a social enterprise that
is treated as a partnership for tax purposes
must be careful to select a social enterprise
that conducts activities which are closely
aligned with the charity’s own mission.

B. Effect of Joint Venture Rules on a
Charity’s Investment in Social Enterprise.
Because a social enterprise generally
includes for-profit parties as owners, a
charity must be mindful of the IRS’s stance
on joint ventures between charities and forprofit parties when deciding to invest in a
social enterprise.
In particular, if the
investment is a significant activity of the
charity, the charity must be careful to
structure its investment in the social
enterprise so as to not jeopardize the
charity’s tax-exempt status. The case law
and IRS rulings on joint ventures between
charities and for-profit parties focus on the
charity’s ability to ensure that the joint
venture is operated to further charitable
purposes.226
As applied to social
enterprises, it is not clear how these rulings
would impact the amount of control that a
charitable investor should maintain over the
operations of the social enterprise. In
particular, the nature of a social enterprise
dictates that the social enterprise already
elevates the accomplishment of charitable
purposes over the maximization of profits
for its owners. This is especially true in the
case of the L3C which is required to operate
significantly to accomplish charitable or
educational purposes and not significantly
for
income
production
or
capital
appreciation.227 Accordingly, it may not be
as important for a charitable investor in a
joint venture formed as a L3C to ensure that
the social enterprise is operated to further
charitable purposes as it is when the joint
venture is formed using traditional business
models. However, whether the IRS and the
courts will adopt this view is uncertain.
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See id. at 624.
See I.R.C. § 512(b). If the L3C derives the
passive income from debt-financed property,
then such income may be included in the
charitable investor’s unrelated business income
as debt-financed income. See Part IV.E. of this
outline.
224
See I.R.C. § 513; see also Part IV.A. of this
outline.
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See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d).
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See e.g., St. David’s Health Care System v.
United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003);
Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C.
47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001);
Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974.; Rev. Rul.
98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17; see also Part III. of this
outline.
227
See Reiser, supra note 207 at 622.
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